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Wise or mad crowds? The cognitive mechanisms 
underlying information cascades
Alan N. Tump1*, Timothy J. Pleskac1,2, Ralf H. J. M. Kurvers1
Whether getting vaccinated, buying stocks, or crossing streets, people rarely make decisions alone. Rather, multiple 
people decide sequentially, setting the stage for information cascades whereby early-deciding individuals can 
influence others’ choices. To understand how information cascades through social systems, it is essential to 
capture the dynamics of the decision-making process. We introduce the social drift–diffusion model to capture 
these dynamics. We tested our model using a sequential choice task. The model was able to recover the dynamics of 
the social decision-making process, accurately capturing how individuals integrate personal and social information 
dynamically over time and when their decisions were timed. Our results show the importance of the interrelationships 
between accuracy, confidence, and response time in shaping the quality of information cascades. The model 
reveals the importance of capturing the dynamics of decision processes to understand how information cascades 
in social systems, paving the way for applications in other social systems.
INTRODUCTION
In many situations—be they financial investments, consumer choices, 
or simply crossing the street—one is generally not making a decision 
alone. Rather, there are many other people present each making their 
own decisions. In such situations, people can observe the choices of 
others and use that information to inform their own decisions. Early- 
deciding individuals can thereby trigger information cascades, in 
which later-deciding individuals adopt earlier choices, potentially 
creating a situation where, in the extreme case, everyone does what 
everyone else is doing, even at the expense of abandoning their private 
information (1–3).
Yet, for a myriad of reasons—from limited time and computational 
resources to biases in the decision process—people’s choices do not 
always perfectly reflect the true state of the world. Information 
cascades can thus promote both positive and negative outcomes: In 
online environments, for example, both true and fake news can spread 
quickly (4); in offline environments, the behavior of initial pedestrians 
crossing a road can amplify both safe and risky behaviors in 
other pedestrians (5). Understanding the conditions leading to 
positive and negative information cascades is crucial across many 
domains, including financial markets (6), consumer preferences 
(7), political opinion formation (8), and opinion dynamics in social 
networks (9).
To understand the conditions underlying positive and negative 
information cascades, we need to model the timing of individual 
decisions and how individuals integrate personal and social infor-
mation (i.e., other people’s decisions) dynamically over time. We 
currently, however, lack a detailed understanding of the individual 
decision process in sequential choice paradigms. Many models of 
information cascades assume a random decision order and are thus 
ill-equipped to predict who will respond earlier and why [e.g., 
(1, 2, 10–12)]. When models of information cascades do refer to the 
timing of decisions, they do so often from an optimal Bayesian perspec-
tive based on the quality of each individual’s private information 
and typically model only the order in which decisions arrive [e.g., 
(13–15)]. Yet, we know that people’s actual choice behavior often 
deviates systematically from optimal Bayesian models (16–18). More-
over, arguably, a fully descriptive model needs to account for the 
speed of people’s choices.
To address these shortcomings, we developed a dynamic theory 
of social decision-making by focusing on each individual’s decision 
process. As a basis, we took a well-established modeling framework 
of individual decision-making that models decisions as a dynamic 
process in which information is accumulated as evidence over time 
until a threshold is reached [e.g., (19, 20)]. This evidence accumula-
tion process has been successful in accounting for a wide range of 
decisions in domains including perception (21), memory (19), 
categorization (22), preference (23), and inference (17) and has 
successfully been applied to analyze the influence of static social 
information (24, 25). We extended this evidence accumulation 
framework by showing how the choices of others are integrated 
with personal information and together accumulated as evidence. 
This approach provides a process-level account of the choices and 
response times (RTs) of individuals in dynamic social systems. We 
tested the model in an empirical study. Findings showed that participants 
self-organize based on the quality of their personal information so 
that late deciders benefit from observing the choices of early deciders. 
Fitting the model to the data allowed us to test several hypotheses 
about how individuals simultaneously combine personal and social 
information and how they time their decision in groups. In addition, 
we reveal mechanisms leading to the amplification of correct or in-
correct cascading information.
Social drift–diffusion model
Models of the evidence accumulation process during decision-making 
include the drift-diffusion model (DDM) (19, 26), the linear ballistic 
accumulator model (27), and the leaky competing accumulator model 
(20). Most of these models can, in principle, be extended to model a 
social system. Here, we focus on the DDM, arguably the most success-
ful framework for accounting for human choice behavior, including 
some of the most basic aspects of the decision process, such as the 
speed-accuracy trade-off (21, 28), the construction of preferences 
(23), the formation of confidence judgments (17), the emergence of 
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response biases (29, 30), and how attention guides the evidence ac-
cumulation process (31).
According to the DDM, people faced with a choice between two 
options, A or B, base their choice on an internal level of evidence. 
Initially, people can have a prior tendency and lean toward either 
option. This is modeled as an initial level of evidence. Over time, 
people extract further information about the options and accumu-
late this information as evidence. This accumulation gives rise to an 
evolving (latent) level of evidence, as depicted by the jagged line in 
Fig. 1A. The jaggedness arises because each sample of evidence is 
noisy (i.e., the stimuli itself and the cognitive and neural processes 
introduce variability into the evidence accumulation). Once a choice 
threshold has been reached, a decision is made. If the accumulated 
evidence reaches the upper threshold, option A is selected; if it 
crosses the lower threshold, option B is selected. The time it takes 
for the evidence to reach either threshold is the predicted RT. In the 
social DDM, we modify this framework to cover multiple individuals 
accumulating evidence at the same time (Fig. 1A). In this case, the 
evidence comes from two sources: personal information, gathered 
from sampling the physical environment (e.g., for visual or auditory 
cues), and social information, gathered by observing the behavior of 
others (32).
Formally, we denote the cumulative evidence at time point t as 
L(t). At the start, individuals may favor one option over the other, 
described by their relative start point. Often, the start point represents 
initial bias toward either option [e.g., (28)]. Here, in part because of 
the experimental design, the relative start point  is determined by 
people’s initial evidence and expressed by their choice and confidence 
from an initial stage of the decision task (see Table 1). Such an 
approach is consistent with current models of confidence (17, 33). 
At each time step t, the current state of evidence L(t) is updated by 
sampling new evidence until a decision is made (i.e., until the level 
of evidence reaches a choice threshold )
  L(t + t ) = L(t ) + [  p +   s (t ) ] × t +  √ 
_
 t × ϵ (1)
where ϵ is Gaussian white noise (i.e., the diffusion process) with a 
mean of 0 and a variance of 1. The parameters p and s(t) correspond 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the social DDM and the experimental paradigm. (A) A generic example of the social DDM with five individuals, each represented by a jagged line. 
The start point of each individual indicates the personal evidence accumulated up to that point. At the start, no individual exceeds the choice threshold, and social infor-
mation is absent, implying no social drift (as indicated by the horizontal arrow). Individuals who begin close to either of the thresholds (red lines) are likely to choose 
early, providing social information for undecided individuals. This social information affects the rate of evidence accumulation, with the drift rate shifting toward the 
choice threshold favored by the majority (as indicated by the arrow pointing upward). (B) Stages of the predator detection task. During the personal phase, individuals 
briefly observe a grid of “sharks” and “tuna.” They then make a personal decision whether to “stay” or “escape” and report their confidence in that decision. In the subsequent 
social phase, they are asked to make a second decision on whether to “stay” or “escape,” but now, they can freely time their decisions and simultaneously observe the 
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to the strength of the personal and social information uptake, 
respectively. Personal information uptake describes the integration 
of information extracted directly from the physical environment, as 
well as the evaluation of information from memory. Social informa-
tion is defined as the majority size M(t) of the individuals who 
have decided at time point t [see also (2, 3)]
  M(t) =  N A (t) −  N B (t) (2)
where NA(t) and NB(t) are the number of individuals who have 
already decided for option A or B, respectively. As the impact of 
majority size on social information use has formerly been success-
fully described by a power law [see also (34)], we model its impact 
on the social drift rate with a power function
   s (t) = s × M  (t) q (3)
The parameter s is a scaling factor that influences the strength of the 
social drift; q governs the shape of the power function. When q = 1, 
each additional choice for the majority option has the same influence 
on the social drift rate (i.e., a linear effect); when q > 1 (q < 1), each 
additional choice for the majority option has an increasingly stronger 
(weaker) impact on the social drift rate. Note that, in contrast to the 
individual drift rate, the social drift rate can vary over time (indicated 
by the changing direction of the arrows in Fig. 1A). By incorporating 
a social drift into the classical DDM, the social DDM can account 
for individuals being emitters and receivers of social information 
and thereby capture the dynamic information exchange among 
group members.
In sum, the social DDM characterizes (i) how individuals incor-
porate personal information with the parameters  and p, (ii) how 
individuals incorporate social information depending on the majority 
size via the parameters s and q, and (iii) individuals’ willingness to 
wait for social information with the parameter  (see Table 1 for all 
parameter descriptions).
Predator detection task
We tested the social DDM in an empirical study (see Fig. 1B; see 
Methods for full details). In brief, participants were divided into 
groups of varying sizes (“small”: n = 3 individuals; “medium”: n = 7 
to 10 individuals; or “large”: n = 15 to 17 individuals). Each group of 
participants was seated together in a single room, facing a large 
screen. Participants were asked to imagine being a fish in a school 
facing a choice between two alternatives—namely whether to escape 
or stay—depending on the presence of predators, in this case, sharks. 
They were instructed to escape when five or more sharks were present 
and to stay when four or fewer sharks were present. At each trial, 
participants were shown—for 2 s—a grid with a varying number 
(3, 4, 6, or 7) of sharks hidden among harmless fish. Participants 
first made a personal choice on whether to “stay” or “escape” and 
then reported their confidence in that choice on a scale from 50 
to 100%. They then entered the social phase, in which they had a 
maximum of 20 s to make a second decision on whether to “stay” 
or “escape,” but without seeing the grid again. Instead, the display 
showed a count of the number of choices for each option. Participants 
were free to enter their choice at any point in time; they could thus 
respond early (thereby providing social information) or wait to observe 
the decisions of others. However, they could only decide once. Last, 
we provided feedback on the correct choice.
RESULTS
Empirical results: Groups show beneficial self-organization 
according to information quality
Participants achieved an accuracy of 74% in their personal choice 
(Fig. 2A), and participants reporting higher confidence in their personal 
choice were also more accurate [ = 3.82, credible interval (CI) = 3.35 
to 4.28; Fig. 2B]. Participants were thus—at least partly—aware of 
the quality of their personal information. We fitted a two-stage dynamic 
signal detection (2DSD) model (17) to the choice, RT, and confi-
dence data from the personal phase (see Supplementary Results and 
Discussion). The close correspondence between the model and the 
data suggests that a drift-diffusion process is a good description of 
the decision process during this stage of the experiment.
With an average accuracy of 79%, participants’ choices during 
the social phase, where they had the opportunity to wait for social 
information before choosing again, were more accurate ( = 0.3, 
CI = 0.20 to 0.39; Fig. 2A). The reported level of confidence in their 
personal choice predicted their likelihood to improve ( = −4.27, 
CI = −4.88 to −3.68; Fig. 3A): participants reporting the lowest 
Table 1. Description of the parameters of the social DDM.  
Model feature Parameter Description
Nondecision 
time 
Response latency (e.g., motor RT). 
The parameter  describes the 
time relative to the individual’s 
fastest response.
Relative start 
point   =   
1 _ 
1 +  e  −a(C−b) 
 
The relative start point is a function 
of the confidence in the 
personal choice C, which ranges 
from highly confident but 
incorrect to highly confident 
and correct (Fig. 4B). Parameter 
a determines how sensitive the 
start point is to changes in 
confidence; b captures other 
factors besides confidence in 




The average rate of evidence 
accumulation supporting the 
personal choice (Fig. 4C).
Social drift  
rate s(t) = s × M(t)
q
The social drift rate describes the 
impact of social information, 
with s being a scaling parameter 
that influences the strength of 
the social drift rate and q being 
a parameter that shapes the 
power function describing the 
relationship of majority size M(t) 
and social drift rate (Fig. 4D).
Choice 
threshold 
The amount of evidence an 
individual has to accumulate to 
make a decision;  (−) reflects 
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confidence level improved in more than 15% of trials; whereas the most 
confident, in less than 1% of trials. Why do unconfident participants 
achieve such higher gains from the social process? There appear to 
be two mechanisms that underly this. First, participants reporting 
lower confidence waited longer before making a decision during the 
social phase ( = −4.86, CI = −5.22 to −4.5; Fig. 3B). Second, partic-
ipants partly adopted the decisions of others ( = 0.62, CI = 0.57 to 
0.67; Fig. 3C): the larger the majority for the opposing option, the 
more likely participants were to change their decision. Individuals 
rarely changed their minds if the majority agreed with their personal 
decision. As fig. S1 shows, participants followed both correct and 
incorrect majorities, highlighting the importance of the accuracy of 
early-deciding participants for triggering positive/negative informa-
tion cascades. Figure 3D shows the consequences of these patterns: 
Participants whose personal choices were accurate (and confident) 
tended to respond early in the social phase, whereas those whose 
choices were inaccurate (and unconfident) tended to wait longer, as 
illustrated by the downward trend of the blue dots (slope:  = −0.16, 
CI = −0.18  to −0.14). The latter participants increased their accu-
racy during the social phase through social influence, as illustrated 
by the higher yellow dots compared to the corresponding blue dots 
at higher RTs (interaction:  = 0.11, CI = 0.09 to 0.13).
Participants in groups, thus, appeared to self-organize according 
to information quality, with confident and accurate participants 
deciding early, thereby providing high-quality information for the 
less confident and less accurate participants who decided later. 
This beneficial self-organization depended on two crucial aspects: 
(i) a positive relationship between confidence and accuracy of personal 
choice across group members and (ii) a negative relationship between 
confidence and RT during the social choice phase. As Fig. 3E illustrates, 
groups showed the highest improvement when both conditions 
were met, and this occurred in most of the trials. Improvement was 
credibly lower for all other conditions (table S1).
Model results: The cognitive mechanisms driving  
self-organization
To understand the processes leading to the self-organization of groups, 
we need to understand the cognitive mechanisms underlying in-
dividuals’ dynamic integration of personal and social information 
over time. To this end, we developed the social DDM (Fig. 1A and 
Table 1), which allowed us to test competing hypotheses on how 
participants integrate personal and social information over time. 
We examined three model features: (i) Individuals base their start 
point on their personal decision and reported confidence. (ii) When 
participants start drifting, they drift toward the correct option, their 
initially chosen option, or neither of the two. (iii) When social in-
formation becomes available, participants drift toward the option 
favored by the majority. We tested several candidate models com-
posed of various combinations of these three features and used the 
deviance information criterion [DIC; (35)] to compare their performance 
where lower values indicate a better performing model. Figure 4A 
shows the models’ DIC values relative to that of the best model (see 
also table S2). In the following, we present the results of the model 
with the lowest DIC (see table S3 for parameter estimates). Last, to 
test how the cognitive mechanisms were affected by group size, we 
compared the different group sizes (see table S4).
Individuals incorporate personal information via start point 
and drift rate
Participants incorporated their personal information (i.e., personal 
choice and confidence) during the social decision process in two 
distinct ways. First, consistent with current models of choice and 
confidence judgments (17, 33), they shifted their start point toward 
their initially chosen option: Individuals who reported higher con-
fidence in the (in)correct option started closer to the threshold of 
the (in)correct option (small: a = 4.20, CI = 3.11 to 5.35; medium: 
a = 3.42, CI = 2.81 to 4.07; large: a = 3.90, CI = 3.46 to 4.37; Fig. 4B). 
This implies that individuals with high confidence in their personal 
choice were more likely to decide in favor of this option and to do 
so fast. Second, participants drifted toward the threshold of their 
initially chosen option (small: p = 0.65, CI = 0.45 to 0.86; medium: 
p = 0.62, CI = 0.50 to 0.75; large: p = 0.53, CI = 0.47 to 0.59; Fig. 4C). 
Both processes were independent of group size (table S4). In sum, 
across all group sizes, highly confident participants started close to 
the choice threshold of their initially chosen option and, on top of 
that, drifted toward that option, whereas participants with low confidence 
started out unbiased (i.e., in the middle between the thresholds).
Individuals incorporate social information via drift rate
We found that the drift rates were credibly influenced by the majority 
(Fig. 4D). The larger the majority favoring an option, the more 
strongly participants drifted toward that option. The shape of the 
relationship between majority size and social drift rate (the q parameter) 
differed between group sizes (small versus medium: q = 0.82, CI = 0.22 
to 1.44; medium versus large: q = 0.27, CI = 0.14 to 0.41). In small 
groups, the drift rate increased with increasing majority size following 
a convex shape. In larger groups, each additional individual voting 
for the majority had less impact than the preceding one, and this 
function followed a concave shape. Accordingly, the influence of a 
single individual was larger in small groups than in large groups. 
Comparing the strength of the personal drift rate (i.e., toward the 
choice threshold of the initially chosen option) to the social drift 
rate (i.e., toward the option favored by the majority) showed that a 
majority of approximately two is required to counteract an individual’s 
tendency to drift toward the choice threshold reflecting their initial 
choice. This highlights participants’ tendency to give personal in-
formation more weight than social information. Corroborating this 
finding, Fig. 3C shows that a majority of approximately four partic-
ipants in favor of the opposing option is required to induce a 50% 
Fig. 2. Choice accuracy and the relationship between personal accuracy and 
confidence. (A) Accuracy of the personal and social choices. Individuals, on aver-
age, achieved a higher decision accuracy during the social choice as compared to 
the personal choice. Each line connects a participant’s average accuracy during the 
personal and social choice (n = 141 participants). (B) Participants reporting a higher 
confidence in their personal choice were more likely to be correct in their personal 
choice. The points and error bars reflect the mean and the 95% CIs of the posterior 
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likelihood of changing a participant’s decision. Last, we found that 
participants’ willingness to wait for social information, captured 
by the threshold parameter , did not differ between group sizes 
(Fig. 4E).
Model predictions: The social DDM captures the 
self-organizing dynamics
The model described above was able to recover all the key features 
of the dynamics of the social decision-making process. The dashed 
lines in Fig. 3 show the model predictions of the social DDM. In line 
with the empirical data, the social DDM predicts that unconfident 
participants wait longer before making a decision (Fig. 3B), that in-
dividuals are increasingly likely to follow the majority as the size of 
that majority increases (Fig. 3C), and that participants whose personal 
choices were inaccurate wait longer and improve more during the 
social phase (Fig. 3D). As a result, participants with low confidence 
in their personal choice improved most (Fig. 3A). We investigated 
the validity of the model with a parameter recovery analysis (see 
Supplementary Information). For all parameters, the generating 
and recovered parameters were highly correlated, implying that 
each parameter describes a distinct mechanism. Furthermore, all 
recovered parameter estimates were close to the generating parameters, 
affirming the validity of the magnitude of the parameter estimates 
as captured by the social DDM (fig. S3).
Model simulations: The mechanisms driving 
positive/negative cascades
Next, we used the social DDM and its ability to capture the integra-
tion of personal and social information to investigate what psycho-
logical factors shape the quality of information cascades. To do so, 
we implemented the social DDM within an agent-based simulation 
and simulated a group of 10 agents who, at the start, hold personal 
information by assigning them correct or wrong choices and associated 
confidences. They then complete the social phase formalized by the 
social DDM (see Eqs. 1 to 3 and Methods for full details). To create 
agents whose behavior resembles the observed behavior of the 
participants, the agents’ behavior was parameterized using the mean 
posterior estimates of medium-sized groups. We systematically varied 
three key features. First, as illustrated above, the beneficial self- 
organization is expected to be strongly influenced by the relationship 
between confidence and personal accuracy; hence, we systematically 
varied the confidence-accuracy relationship by assigning either 
higher, similar, or lower confidence to agents with a correct choice 
compared to agents with a wrong choice. Second, it is well known 
that the level of collective improvement depends on the average 
mean personal accuracy (2); therefore, we varied the agents’ personal 
accuracy by assigning 30, 50, or 70% correct personal choices to 
agents. Third, a key feature of the social DDM is the choice threshold 
Fig. 3. Empirical results and predictions of the social DDM. Participants reporting higher confidence in their personal choice (A) improved less and (B) responded 
earlier during the social choice. (C) The larger the majority favoring the opposing option, the more likely participants were to change their decision. (D) The choices of 
participants who responded later in the social choice were less accurate in the personal choice (declining blue dots) but improved more in the social choice (indicated by 
the increasing difference between blue and yellow dots at later RTs). For visualization purposes, RTs are binned by rounding to the closest integer. RTs greater than 13 s 
(less than 1%) were assigned to the 12-s bin. (A to D) The dashed lines show the choices and RTs predicted by the social DDM, accurately capturing all relationships. For 
frequency distributions, see fig. S2. (E) Participants improved most when more confident individuals were more accurate (i.e., positive confidence-accuracy correlation; 
yellow dots) and responded earlier (i.e., negative accuracy-RT correlation; see Methods for details). Numbers indicate the number of trials. For all panels, the points and 
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() as this governs the willingness to wait for social information. We 
varied the willingness to wait for social information by assigning a 
low, intermediate, or high choice threshold to all group members. 
Figure 5 shows the results of these simulations.
Across all levels of personal accuracy, we observed the key 
importance of the confidence-accuracy relationship: Whenever this 
relationship is positive (yellow dots), we observed an improvement. 
The strength of improvement is, in turn, mediated by the choice 
threshold: Higher choice thresholds allowed agents to improve 
more. This can be explained because high choice thresholds allow for 
a better match between confidence and decision time (i.e., beneficial 
self-organization). Mirroring these results, we found detrimental 
effects when confident individuals were less accurate (blue dots), 
and this effect was stronger the higher the choice threshold. That is, 
perhaps counterintuitively when agents were more cautious, they 
were also more susceptible bad social information creating negative 
information cascades. When there was no relationship between con-
fidence and accuracy, we observed beneficial (detrimental) effects 
when personal accuracy was above (below) chance, and again, these 
effects were strongest at high choice threshold. These simulations 
illustrate the importance of a positive confidence-accuracy relation-
ship, an overall willingness to wait for social information and high 
personal accuracy, for the emergence of positive information cascades 
and, hence, wise crowds.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that the behavior of individuals in a social sequential 
decision-making task can be described by an evidence accumulation 
process whereby personal and social information is integrated until 
a decision is made, formalized by the social DDM. The model accurately 
predicts decision time and choice by taking personal information, 
social information, and the willingness to wait for social informa-
tion into account. It successfully captured all the interrelationships 
of the key behavioral results of the social phase, thereby revealing 
the cognitive underpinnings of the group-level self-organization 
according to information quality. Measuring how individuals process 
personal and social information affords a deeper understanding of 
how individuals in a social environment cope with the complex 
problem of evaluating personal information and how they time 
their decision and incorporate social information.
During the social decision-making process, individuals incorpo-
rated personal information in two ways: At the start of the process, 
they adjusted their subjective level of evidence to their confidence 
(i.e., they adjusted their start point), and during the process, they 
reinforced their “belief” in their original choice over time (i.e., they 
drifted toward the choice threshold of their personal choice). We 
also found evidence for such “belief reinforcement” over time in the 
personal phase (see 2DSD model analysis in Supplementary Infor-
mation). The reinforcement of initial beliefs can potentially have a 
Fig. 4. Model comparison and individual- and group-level fittings of the social DDM for different group sizes. (A) The DIC values of all models relative to the model 
with the lowest DIC. The model with the lowest DIC (i.e., preferred model) features a (i) confidence-dependent start point, (ii) drift toward the initially chosen option, and 
(iii) social drift. (B) Participants reporting higher confidence in the correct/incorrect choice started closer to the correct/incorrect choice threshold at y value of 1/0. 
(C) Evidence tended to drift toward the choice threshold of the option chosen during the personal phase. (D) The larger the majority favoring an option, the more strongly 
participants drifted toward the choice threshold favored by the majority. Participants in smaller groups had a stronger drift given the same majority size. (E) The choice 
threshold , reflecting a participant’s willingness to wait for social information, did not differ between group sizes. Gray lines/dots represent individual-level fittings; 
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large influence in real-world social choices. Because individuals 
generally gather personal information before receiving social infor-
mation, reinforcement of initial beliefs can lead to situations where 
even strong counterfactual social information may no longer prove 
persuasive [i.e., confirmation bias (36, 37)]. Many studies have found 
that individuals indeed weight personal information more strongly 
than social information, a phenomenon called egocentric discounting 
[e.g., (38–41)]. In almost all of these studies, participants made a 
personal judgment before receiving social information. When the 
order was reversed, the influence of social information indeed increased 
(42). Our finding of belief reinforcement provides a compelling ex-
planation for stronger egocentric discounting, simply by providing 
personal information first. Future studies could test whether increas-
ing the length of the delay between personal choice and provision of 
social information reduces the influence of social information, as 
predicted by the social DDM.
When looking at how social information entered the evidence 
accumulation process, we found that individuals incorporated social 
information by drifting toward the choice threshold favored by the 
majority. The larger the majority size, the more strongly individuals 
drifted toward that majority choice. For medium- and large-sized 
groups, the relationship followed a concave power function, where 
each additional individual voting for the majority choice had less 
additional impact on the drift rate. Such saturating influence is con-
sistent with the findings of earlier studies (34, 43, 44). In groups of 
three, the relationship followed a convex function. Weighting single 
choices less with increasing group size is probably an adaptive strategy: 
In larger groups, waiting for further decisions avoids confirming 
fast but wrong choices, as others can still correct initial mistakes. In 
small groups, fast but wrong choices will also occur, but because there 
are few others to correct those choices, there is little point in delay-
ing a response via a reduced social drift rate. Future studies could 
use the social DDM to investigate more complex strategies of social 
information integration. We used a power function to model social 
information uptake. There is empirical evidence coming from psy-
chophysics that the relationship between stimulus intensity and 
perceived intensity often follows a power law [Steven’s power law 
(45)], and this has also been reported for social information use 
(34, 43). However, individuals may also use the so-called quorum 
responses (12, 46), which down-weight small minorities, but ramp 
up social information use once a critical threshold of social informa-
tion is reached. Other potential strategies include weighting choices 
according to others’ RTs (3) or strong conformity in the presence 
of unanimity among others. Another crucial aspect shaping the 
characteristics of information cascades is the amount of information 
conveyed in the choices of predecessors (47). Only detailed under-
standing of the applied strategies allows us to identify choices that 
are expected be mostly imitative and, hence, uninformative or which 
ones are mostly based on personal information and, hence, infor-
mative for later-deciding individuals. We believe that our framework 
provides a tool to test these competing strategies of social informa-
tion use in social dynamic decision-making environments.
The social DDM can also characterize other features of the 
dynamics of the social decision-making process. Beyond capturing 
how social information affects the accumulation of evidence, it also 
captures an individual’s willingness to wait for social information 
via the decision threshold parameter . Thus, the model is able to 
distinguish, for instance, between individuals who are sensitive to 
majorities but unwilling to wait for social information and individuals 
who may be interested in observing the decisions of others but 
put more weight on their own personal information. The capacity 
to unify these different facets of social decision-making within a 
single theoretical framework is a long-standing goal of social decision- 
making in the areas of collective animal behavior (10, 12) and social 
psychology (34). Future studies could investigate the interrelationships 
between the different parameters and potential links to established 
personality measures.
Previous studies have provided evidence for both positive infor-
mation cascades, such as knowledgeable individuals leading others 
to resources or safety (48–50), and negative ones, such as the spread 
of fake news, mobbing, or stampedes (2, 51). Here, we have shown 
the importance of two key aspects promoting positive information 
cascades. First is a positive confidence-accuracy relationship across 
group members. In many contexts, confidence is a valid cue for accuracy 
Fig. 5. Agent-based simulations of the social DDM. The predicted improvement for different choice thresholds, for situations in which confident agents are more 
accurate (yellow dots), as accurate (black dots), or less accurate (blue dots) than unconfident agents. (A) Groups with a high average personal accuracy improved, unless 
confident agents were less accurate than unconfident ones. (B and C) Groups with a personal accuracy of 50 and 30% only improved when confident agents were more 
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(52, 53). The strongest association of confidence and accuracy across 
group members arises when all individuals are more confident when 
they are more accurate and when their confidence scales are well 
aligned [i.e., a given level of confidence implies the same level of 
accuracy across individuals; see also (54)]. The second key aspect 
promoting positive information cascades is a negative relationship 
between confidence and RT, meaning that more confident individuals 
respond faster. Our simulations demonstrate the importance of the 
overall willingness to wait for social information for groups to co-
ordinate their responses according to their confidences and, hence, 
improve. Several further mechanisms in the social DDM are expected 
to influence this relationship—for example, how individuals adjust 
their start point depending on their confidence. If confident in-
dividuals do not start closer to a choice threshold, they are not ex-
pected to respond earlier. Also, interindividual differences in model 
parameters such as choice thresholds or personal and social drift 
rate could negatively affect the confidence-RT relationship.
The quality of information cascades is shaped by the relationship 
between accuracy and RT, whereby it is crucial for positive informa-
tion cascades that accurate individuals respond faster than inaccurate 
individuals. The social DDM framework allows us to predict the 
quality of information cascades based on individual or task charac-
teristics. For example, if individuals differ in their ability to solve a 
task (e.g., individual differences in drift rates), those with higher 
ability are expected to make faster, more accurate decisions than the 
less competent ones, triggering positive information cascades. In 
contrast, when individuals differ systematically in their speed-accuracy 
trade-off [e.g., differences in threshold separation; (55)], and groups 
harbor both fast, but inaccurate, individuals and slow, but accurate, 
individuals, we expect relatively many fast errors, triggering negative 
information cascades.
The social DDM not only allows to identify cognitive underpinnings 
of the sequential decision process. By providing a descriptive model 
with well-informed model characteristics via the measured parameter 
estimates, it also allows to conduct agent-based simulations with 
processes closely resembling the participants’ behavior. Here, we 
used simulations to investigate how personal accuracy, confidence- 
accuracy correlations, and the decision threshold are expected to in-
fluence the groups’ ability to improve. This framework can be used 
in future studies to investigate other model features to generate further 
predictions that can, in turn, be tested in empirical studies.
Because the DDM has been successful in accounting for behavioral 
phenomena across a wide range of tasks, our extension to social 
environments opens up new possibilities for studying a range of 
social and collective phenomena. It makes it possible to measure 
how individuals combine personal and social information and time 
their decisions whenever decisions are made sequentially and the 
choices are—at least partially—observable by others. We hope that 
future work will apply and extend the social DDM to areas such as 
dynamics in consumer preferences (7), emergency evacuations (56), 
and social media (4) or to areas of animal social and collective 
behavior such as predator detection and mate choice (57).
METHODS
Experimental procedure
Participants were 141 students from the Wageningen University 
(The Netherlands) and the University of Bielefeld (Germany). Par-
ticipants were divided into 16 groups, with group size ranging from 
small (n = 3 individuals, 5 groups) to medium (n = 7 to 10 individuals, 
6 groups), to large (n = 15 to 17 individuals, 5 groups). We aimed 
for a similar number of groups per group size (see also table S5). 
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the 
Max Planck Institute for Human Development. Before participa-
tion, each participant signed an informed consent form. Each 
group of individuals was seated on chairs facing a large screen. They 
were confronted with the following binary decision task: Individuals 
briefly (for 2 s) observed an image of a shoal of 72 stylized fish (tuna 
and sharks aligned in an 8 by 9 grid; see Fig. 1B). Participants were 
instructed to choose “escape” if there were five or more sharks and 
“stay” if there were four or fewer. The number of sharks present was 
three, four, six, or seven, and each number was repeated 10 times, 
resulting in 40 trials. Treatment order was randomized. After ob-
serving a shoal of fish, individuals had 5 s to report their personal 
decision and an additional 5 s to report their confidence in their per-
sonal decision. Participants were instructed to use confidence as the 
subjective probability of being correct on a scale from 50 to 100%. 
In the subsequent social phase, participants made a second decision on 
the same image. During this phase, they received social information in 
the form of the number of group members who had already decided 
on a particular option, displayed on the screen. The social infor-
mation was first updated after 3 s and then iteratively every 2 s (i.e., 
at 3, 5, 7, 9,…,19 s). The social phase lasted 20 s. A countdown timer 
on the screen indicated the remaining choice time. Participants 
made all decisions using a wireless keypad. Afterward, we provided 
feedback on the correct choice. Participants received 0 points for 
an incorrect decision and 100 points for a correct decision. To avoid 
a scenario in which all participants waited until the last second for 
social information, we introduced a small cost of one point per 
second for correct decisions during the social phase. The members of each 
group with the highest payoff got a small reward in kind. Before the 40 study 
trials, participants completed two test trials to familiarize themselves 
with the procedure. These results were excluded from the analyses.
Statistical analysis
We used Bayesian hierarchical generalized linear models with the 
“brms” package (58) to analyze the empirical data. The parameter 
estimates were generated by running five Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) simulations in parallel with 5000 iterations, of which the 
first 2500 were discarded as burn-in to reduce autocorrelations. To 
analyze the difference in the accuracy of personal and social choices 
(Fig. 2A), we fitted choice correct (yes/no) as a binary response vari-
able and type of choice (personal/social) as a population-level effect 
(i.e., fixed effect). In this model (and all following models, unless 
stated otherwise), we included individual and group identity as 
group-level effects (i.e., mixed effects). We ran separate models to 
investigate how confidence related to (i) personal accuracy (Fig. 2B), 
(ii) likelihood to improve (Fig. 3A), and (iii) RT during social choice 
(Fig. 3B). “Personal accuracy” (correct/incorrect) and “likelihood to 
improve” (yes/no) were fitted as binomial response variables and 
“RT during social choice” as an exponentially modified Gaussian 
(ex-Gaussian) distributed response variable. Confidence was included as 
a population-level effect in all three models. To investigate whether 
the majority size affected the likelihood of an individual changing 
its decision (Fig. 3E), we fitted the likelihood to change the decision 
as a binary response variable (yes/no) and majority size favoring the 
opposing option as a population-level effect. To analyze the rela-
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and social choices (Fig. 3D), we used decision correct (yes/no) as a 
binary response variable and type of choice (personal/social) in in-
teraction with RT as a population-level effect.
To investigate how the interrelationships between confidence, 
accuracy, and RT affected improvement (Fig. 3E), we first calculated— 
for each group and trial—the Spearman’s correlation coefficients 
of confidence and accuracy as well as of confidence and RT. We 
converted these coefficients into dichotomous variables, with the 
correlation coefficient being either 0 and above or below 0. We 
excluded trials in which all individuals reported identical choices or 
confidences, because it was impossible to calculate correlation co-
efficients for these. We treated all four possible combinations of 
correlations as different levels of a single factor. We included the 
factor as a population-level effect and improvement as response 
variable. In this model, group identity was the only group-level 
effect. As statistical summary, we report the mean of the posterior 
distributions and the 95% CIs (see table S1 for the results of the 
regression models). To visualize the results (Figs. 2 and 3), while 
accounting for the hierarchical structure of the data, we reran the 
regression models, treating the continuous variables as categorical 
data. Unless stated otherwise, the points and error bars reflect the 
mean and the 95% CI of the posterior distribution. Visual inspection 
of the Markov chains and the Gelman-Rubin statistic ( ̂  R ) indicated 
that all Markov chains converged.
Social DDM: Model parameter estimation
To understand the dynamics of the social phase, we developed the 
social DDM (Fig. 1A and Table 1). The model features decisions 
with variable drift rates to obtain choice and RT predictions. We 
calculated the probability density function of RTs and associated 
choice probabilities of the drift-diffusion process by implementing 
an extended version of a Markov chain approach (59). A detailed 
description of how to implement the Markov chain approach can be 
found in (59).
The model assumes that the state space of the decision maker’s 
evidence L is ranging from the lower choice threshold − (reflecting 
the wrong decision) to the upper threshold  (reflecting the correct 
decision), with a step size of  and k being the number of steps to 
reach the choice threshold from a neutral start point
  L = [− k, − (k − 1) , … , − , 0, , … , (k − 1) , k] (4)
where  = k.
Each time step h, the evidence states change with probabilities 
given by a m × m transition probability matrix P, with  m =  2 ×  _   + 1 . 
The elements p1,1 = 1 and pm, m = 1 are the two absorbing states 
and reflect the choice thresholds. The other elements of P with 
1 < i < m are
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with 2 being the diffusion coefficient and u = p + s being the total 
drift rate, whereby p and s are drift rates reflecting the accumula-
tion of personal and social information, respectively (see Table 1). 
The parameter  > 1 improves the approximation of the continuous 
time process. We set  = 1.3, 2 = 1, and h = 0.005. The transition 
probability matrix in its canonical form
 (6)
with PI being a 2 × 2 matrix with the two absorbing states and R a (m − 2) × 
2 matrix containing the transition probabilities that eventually lead to 
the absorbing states in a single transition. Q is a (m − 2) × (m − 2) 
matrix including the remaining transition probabilities. The initial 
evidence state of the process is represented by Z an m − 2 vector 
containing the initial probability distribution. The initial start point 
 is a function of confidence and choice and relative to the upper 
(correct) threshold
   =  1 ─ 
1 +  e −a(C−b) 
(7)
with a and b being free parameters. C is the reported confidence in 
the correct choice and is scaled from 0 (i.e., highly confident and 
wrong) to 1 (i.e., highly confident and correct). We set the distribu-
tion of the initial evidence states by Z* = 1, with * = (m − 3) + 1. 
Because * is not always an integer, we avoid rounding errors by 
giving most probability mass 1 − (* − round(*)) to Zround(*) and 
the rest * − round(*) the closest integer of *. For example, if the 
process starts unbiased (i.e.,  = 0.5) and m = 7, then * = 3 and Z = 
[0,0,1,0,0]. However, if  = 0.55, then * = 3.2 and * − round(*) = 
0.2 and therefore Z = [0,0,0.8,0.2,0]. We account for variable drift 
rates by updating the transition probabilities of Q at t = (3,5,7,9, …,19) s, 
reflecting the iterative updated social information (see the “Ex-
perimental procedure” section). With Qn containing the transition 
probabilities at time point t = nh, we can calculate the probability of 
choosing the correct or wrong option after n time steps
  
[P(correct ∣ n ), P(wrong ∣ n )] =
   
        Z ×  Q 1 ×  Q 2 ×  Q 3 … Q n × R − τ ×  t min 
 (8)
with  being the nondecision time relative to the fastest response of 
the individual tmin. By varying the transition probabilities of Qn with 
changing s, we are able to account for varying social information 
over time.
Integrating the social DDM into a Bayesian estimation technique, 
namely a differential evolution–MCMC algorithm, enables us to 
sample posterior probability densities of the model parameters (see 
Table 1). The differential evolution–MCMC is an extension of the 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm where proposals are generated by 
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(60). To estimate the effect of group size while controlling for 
individual differences, we used a hierarchical framework. Each 
parameter was fitted on an individual level but was simultaneously 
informed by a higher-order group-level prior, a normal distribution 
described by two hyper parameters (i.e., mean and variance), which 
were informed by the individual fittings. To estimate the posterior 
probability densities, we ran 24 chains in parallel, each with a chain 
length of 20,000 including a burn-in period of 10,000 and a thinning 
factor of 10 to reduce autocorrelations. The tuning parameter () 
was set to  = 2.38 / √ 
_
 2d , with d being the dimensionality of the posterior, 
which was d = 2 for the hyperparameters and d = 7 for the individual 
parameters [see (60)]. To further improve the mixing of the parallel 
chains, we included deterministic and probabilistic (i.e., relying on 
the Metropolis-Hastings probability) migration steps where chain 
states are swapped across parallel chains (60). We performed the 
deterministic migration step with a probability of 5% where we first 
determine a random number of n = 2,3, …,24 chains and then sample 
n chains without replacement. We then swap the parameter set in a 
cyclic fashion where the set of the first sampled chain moves to the 
second, the second to the third, and so on, until the last set moves to 
the first set. A deterministic migration step strongly improves the 
mixing behavior of chains but does not resolve the frequent problem 
of differential evolution–MCMC algorithms that outlier chains 
hardly converge. We, therefore, additionally implemented a proba-
bilistic migration step, which was carried out with a probability of 
10%. For the probabilistic version, we swapped proposal states instead 
of accepted states between chains, which therefore still relied on the 
Metropolis-Hastings probability to be accepted. Thereby, we 
sampled two parallel chains and interchanged a single random 
parameter state.
We used the social DDM to compare competing hypotheses on 
how individuals integrate personal and social information. More 
specifically, we examined three model features: (i) Individuals base 
their start point on their personal choice and reported confidence; 
(ii) individuals drift toward the correct option, their initially chosen 
option, or neither of the two; and (iii) individuals drift toward the 
option favored by the majority. We compared the performance of 
models composed of the various combinations of these three features 
using the DIC (35). To investigate the effect of group size on the 
collective dynamics, we categorized groups as small (3 individuals), 
medium (7 to 10 individuals), or large (15 to 17 individuals) and 
fitted the parameters separately for each group size. As a statistical 
summary, we report the mean of the posterior distributions and the 
95% CI. We excluded all observations for which personal choice, 
social choice, confidence, or RT of social choice were missing (~8%) 
and if the RT was below 0.1 s (~6%). The code can be accessed at 
https://osf.io/ejfm4/.
Social DDM: Predictions
To analyze the predictions (i.e., choices and RTs) of the social DDM, 
we generated decisions by sampling from the probability density 
functions produced by the model using the mean of the individual- 
level posterior distribution as model estimates. The probability density 
function was computed for each individual and trial by taking into 
account the individual model estimates, the personal choice, the 
reported confidence, and the social information observed by the 
individual at a given trial. We then sampled 10 choices and RTs 
to account for stochasticity. The model predictions are shown as 
dashed lines in Fig. 3.
Social DDM: Simulations
To analyze how behavioral features affect the quality of information 
cascades, we conducted agent-based simulations of the social DDM 
using a group size of 10 agents (“medium” group size). First, agents 
start with a relative tendency toward an option  determined by the 
assigned personal choices and confidences. Agents then iteratively 
gather further information over time described by Eqs. 1 to 3 until 
they reach a choice threshold . If not stated otherwise, we used the 
mean of the posterior estimate of medium-sized groups to assign 
parameters to the agents (see table S3). We systematically varied three 
key parameters. (i) We varied the confidence-accuracy relationship 
by assigning different confidences to agents with correct or wrong 
personal choices. The confidences assigned to the correct/wrong 
agents were either 100%/50%, 75%/75%, or 50%/100%, reflecting 
correct agents being more, as, or less confident than wrong ones. 
(ii) We varied average personal accuracy by assigning different pro-
portions of correct and wrong personal choices to the agents. The 
average accuracy ranged from 30% (minority correct) to 50% 
(random) to 70% (majority correct). (iii) Last, we varied the height 
of the choice threshold , ranging from 75% (low) to 100% (inter-
mediate) to 125% (high) of the mean of the posterior estimate 
of medium-sized groups. The nondecision time was set to 0 as 
it is relative to a participant’s fastest response and is irrelevant for 
simulated agents. For each combination of average personal ac-
curacy, confidence-accuracy relationship, and threshold, we ran 
10,000 repetitions and reported the average improvement of agents 
after the social phase.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/29/eabb0266/DC1
View/request a protocol for this paper from Bio-protocol.
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